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1. Introduction 
Bens, Nagar and Wong [BNW, 2001] investigate how employee stock option 
plans influence corporate payout policy and investing decisions. BNW hypothesize that 
fmns divert cash from profitable investment expenditures to fund share repurchases in an 
attempt to mitigate earnings-per-share (EPS) dilution from stock option exercises. The 
relation between corporate finance, managerial incentives and investing decisions is a 
rich and important area of academic research. In recent years, the widespread growth in 
employee stock option plans has spurred increased interest on the part of shareholders, 
regulators and academics as to the effects of these plans on fmancing activities, 
incentives and equity valuation. Further, there 1s growing evidence that managers are 
concerned with the financial accounting implications of stock options plans (e.g., Carter 
and Lynch, 2001 ). 
BNW motivate their study with four assumptions about managerial behavior. The 
first assumption is that managers believe employee stock option exerctses "dilute" EPS. 
Second, BNW assert that managers believe share repurchases mechanically increase EPS. 
Third, BNW assume that managers and/or investors myopically focus on short-term EPS. 
The fourth critical assertion is that BNW's sample of S&P 500 firms have severe cash 
constraints and high fmancing costs (e.g., low free cash flow, small reserves of liquid 
assets, and no source of inexpensive short-term debt fmancing) that force managers to 
fund EPS-motivated share repurchases with cash diverted from profitable investment 
projects. 
Under these assumptions, BNW interpret their empirical results as consistent with 
the hypotheses that: 1) fmns repurchase shares m response to top-five executives' option 
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exercises to mitigate EPS dilution, 2) fnms finance these repurchases by decreasing R&D 
and capital expenditures, and 3) this diversion of investment expenditures imposes 
immediate costs on the fnm in the form of declines in the following years' earnings-to-
assets ratio. 
Conference participants questioned the validity of all four of these assumptions. 
They had difficulty reconciling the notion of stock option "dilution" with an econormc 
setting where fnms, on average, use the optimal quantity of options for compensation and 
incentive purposes. Participants also questioned how the above assumptions could be 
reconciled with the econom1c prediction that managers have rational expectations about 
the effects of share repurchases on EPS. First, why would top executives, who are experts 
in applied accounting and finance, believe that options dilute EPS or that share 
repurchases mechanically increase EPS? As noted m Section 3 below, because fmns 
forego eammgs on cash used for share repurchases, repurchase activity 1s likely to 
decrease EPS for a large fraction of BNW's sample flrms. Second, why would managers 
divert funds from investment expenditures when much less costly sources of funds appear 
readily available? Section 4 provides evidence that BNW's sample firms have ample cash 
resetves and free operating cash flow, and access to low-cost short-term borrowing. 
Third, participants questioned whether BNW could identify a plausible contracting 
environment under which managers of S&P 500 fmns fmd it optimal to myopically 
increase this year's EPS at the expense of next year's eammgs. Finally, in light of the 
concerns about the underlying hypotheses, as well as econometric JSsues surrounding the 
tests, there was a general skepticism about whether the empirical results are interpretable. 
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1bis discussion focuses primarily on the validity of the four mam assumptions 
underlying BNW's hypotheses and empirical tests. Sections 2 through 5 examine the four 
assumptions in detail and suggest there is reason to believe these assertions are either 
incorrect or tenuous. Section 6 briefly offers some alternative hypotheses about economic 
relations between share repurchases and employee stock option plans. Concerns about the 
empirical tests are highlighted in Section 7. Section 8 offers concluding remarks. 
2. Do stock option plans "dilute" EPS? 
To assess whether employee stock options are "dilutive", it is important to ftrst 
consider the economic and accounting issues underlying the options -related transactions 
between fums and their employees. Nearly all large public corporations have an 
employee stock option plan. Granting options to employees is conceptually similar to 
ra1smg capital through issuing stock. Employees rece1ve an equity stake in the 
corporation m return for servtces rendered. Like any other factor m production, 
corporations use these employee setVices to earn profits. However, unlike other factors in 
production, grants of options are not expensed in earnings. As such, other things equal, 
the earnings of fums that grant options extensively are expected to be greater than the 
earnings of ftrms that use no options. 
The emphasis of BNW is not on earnings, but rather on EPS. Specifically, BNW 
are concerned with how options "dilute" EPS. Although BNW do not defme EPS 
dilution, it seems that their notion of EPS dilution relates to whether and how employee 
stock option plans decrease EPS (through their effect on the number of shares included in 
the denominator of EPS). Given that managers and investors do not ignore the value 
inherent in stock options, warrants, and other convertible securities (e.g., Aboody, 1996), 
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it 1s reasonable to focus on diluted EPS as opposed to basic EPS (diluted EPS 
incmporates equity positions that are convertible into common stock, whereas basic EPS 
does not). Conference participants asked BNW to more precisely defme option dilution. 
BNW argue that option exercise reflects a dilutive transfer of value from 
shareholders to employees. Tills seems incorrect in light of the following observations. 
As noted above, at the option grant date, the fmn is expected to transfer equity value to 
employees in return for services of equal value. The employees then become partial 
owners of the fmn and share in any future earnings growth and stock price appreciation. 
Empirical evidence suggests that investors understand that options are a form of equity 
when setting stock prices (e.g., Aboody, 1996). Thus, price incmporates investors' 
assessment of the equity value and the claim on earnings inherent in outstanding options. 
In this context, the notion that stock options dilute EPS seems inappropriate. That is, 
nearly all forms of equity fmance, such as common stock and most stock-based securities 
(e.g., convertible debt, warrants, convertible preferred stock) contribute to the shares used 
to compute the denominator ofEPS. Why are stock options singled out as being dilutive? 
BNW focus on the option exercise date as the trigger that causes firms to be 
concerned about stock option dilution. However, the significance of the exercise date in 
this respect is unclear given that the option exercise date is simply the date at which the 
employee decides to trade the exercise price for a share of stock. At the grant date, firms 
certainly understand that the typical long-maturity option has a greater than 90% 
probability of fmishing in-the-money (e.g., see Lambert, Larcker, and Verrecchia, 1991), 
and that employees will always exercise vested in-the-money options prior to 
cancellation 
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Even from a mechanical perspective, conference participants found it difficult to 
see why managers are concerned about EPS dilution at the time of option exerctse, or 
why mitigating this concern would consume significant additional capital. To see this, 
note that the effect of options on the denominator cf diluted EPS is computed under the 
treasury-stock method. The treasury-stock method counts each option as ( 1-X/P) shares 
of stock, where P is the average stock price over the fiscal year and X is the option 
exercise price (for options granted or exercised during the year, P and X are weighted by 
the fraction of the year the option is outstanding). The treasury-stock method shares are 
added to common stock shares to compute the denominator of diluted EPS. Because most 
options are granted at-the-money (i.e., X=P), 1-X/P is generally zero at the grant date. As 
the stock price rises over time, 1-X/P becomes positive, and the denominator of diluted 
EPS increases. At the exercise date, the fum issues a share of stock to the employee in 
return for the exercise price, (i.e., the employee receives value equal to P-X). 
Just prior to option exercise, an option's contribution to the denominator of diluted 
EPS is 1-X/P. After exercise, the contribution of the additional outstanding share to the 
denominator is 1. But the fum also has the exercise proceeds (and if it has a positive 
marginal tax rate, it often obtains cash tax savmgs for the compensation expense 
deduction received upon option exercise). If the fum uses the exercise proceeds to 
repurchase shares, the post-exercise effect on the denominator is 1-X/P: no effect on EPS 
and no "dilution" occurs. Note that cash beyond the exercise proceeds is not necessary to 
hold option "dilution" constant 1 
1 This point raises measurement issues with respect to BNW's measure of option exercise activity 
(ESOEX). ESOEX is measured by BNW as the market price of the shares at the time of exercise less the 
strike price paid by the employees : (P-X)*number of options exercised. Since this "dilution" measure is 
already included in the denominator of diluted EPS prior to exercise, it is not clear why this measure 
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To counter this argument, BNW note that when stock prtces nse over time, 
treasury-stock method shares at the exerctse date can be greater than the treasury-stock 
method shares in the previous period's EPS (i.e., l-X!Pt > 1-X!Pt-1). They suggest that if 
ftrms view prior period EPS as a benchmark, then additional cash beyond the exercise 
proceeds may be necessary to mitigate the increase in l-XIP that has occurred since the 
previous ftscal period. There are at least two problems with this argument First, BNW's 
sample ftrms experienced substantial growth in EPS during the 1996-1999 period, 
making it unlikely that these ftrms were concerned about meeting prior year EPS. Median 
one-year EPS growth was approximately 13% for the full sample and 22% for the 
quartile of ftrms with the greatest option exercises (as measured by ESOEX).2 Second, 
BNW's "dilution avoidance prediction" suggests that dilution from total options 
outstanding, and not option exerctses, ts the correct variable of interest That is, 1-XIP 
mcreases whenever the stock price increases, regardless of whether or not the option is 
exercised. BNW argue that because a dilution avoidance perspective gtves ftrms no 
reason to repurchase shares at the time of grant (i.e., 1-X/P = 0), they choose to conduct 
their tests on option exercises. However, it seems that BNW's tests would be more 
consistent with their underlying arguments if their dilution avoidance hypothesis 
captures firms' concerns about EPS dilution at the time options are exercised. However, given that the 
authors do not define the term "option dilution," it is difficult to definitively determine the appropriate 
dilution measure. 
2 These figures are not reported in BNW. To estimate these measures, data were drawn from the Compustat 
and Execucomp databases using the procedures described in BNW. The descriptive statistics for this 
replicated sample are nearly identical to the descriptive statistics reported in BNW's Table 1. 
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predicted that repurchases occur over time as l-XIP increases for all outstanding options 
(e.g., as in Weisbenner, 2000).3 
3. Do share repurchases increase diluted EP S? 
Share repurchases can be an efficient payout method and an effective signaling 
technique (e.g., Dann, 1981; Ofer and Thakor, 1987; Barclay and Smith, 1988). However, 
as noted by conference participants, in efficient capital markets, repurchasing shares has 
no mechanical effect on fum value. That is, in the absence of an economic motivation, 
share repurchases simply reflect a value-neutral transfer of cash for stock. In the BNW 
framework, managers are assumed to be motivated to repurchase shares, not because they 
are maximizing fum value, but instead because they are myopically focused on short-
term EPS. The following section illustrates that repurchases can have a mechanical 
relation with EPS, but that for most S&P 500 fnms during the 1996-1999 sample period, 
repurchases are likely to have mechanically decreased, not increased, short-term EPS. 
BNW argue that, ''Repurchases decrease the number of shares outstanding and 
have no direct effect on earnings, thus increasing EPS (italics emphasis added)." 
Examples of this perspective can also be found in the practitioner literature. For example, 
in a 2001 Journal of App lied Corporate Finance (JACF, 2001, p29) roundtable 
discussion of capital structure and stock repurchases, Donald Chew of Stern Stewart & 
3 Although BNW provide a robustness check to explore whether share repurchases lead option exercises, 
this test appears to be misspecified. Specifically, in their baseline regression of share repurchases on 
ESOEX (i.e., the stock price less the strike price for exercised options), the authors include future values of 
ESOEX. However, the portion of future ESOEX that is uncorrelated with current values of ESOEX is 
likely to be largely unpredictable because future option exercises depend on future realizations of stock 
returns. In others words, unless firms can predict future stock returns, it seems very unlikely that current 
share repurchases can be explained by future option exercises. A more appropriate test would use 
contemporaneous unexercised options (possibly considering the extent to which these options have recently 
moved in-the-money) as additional independent variable(s) to explain share repurchases. 
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Co. asks, "Dave [Ikenberry], you've mentioned four reasons to buy back stock. But isn't 
there a ftfth motive- namely, to increase earnings per share?" 
The effect of share repurchases on EPS is straightforward and depends on the 
relative numerator and denominator effects. The numerator of EPS reflects ftscal period 
earnings and the denominator reflects weighted average shares outstanding during the 
ftscal period (e.g., shares repurchased at ftscal period end have no effect on EPS whereas 
shares repurchased at fiscal year beginning are subtracted from shares outstanding for the 
full year). Repurchasing shares requires the payout of cash. Whether share repurchases 
increase or decrease short-term EPS depends on whether the foregone return on cash used 
for repurchases is less than or greater than the ratio of the frrm's earnings to the market 
value of equity (i.e., the earnings-to-price ratio). This argument was made by conference 
participants and is well articulated by Richard Thevenet, Assistant Treasurer ofPepsiCo: 
The size of any EPS increase [from share repurchases] depends on the 
algebraic relationship between the frrm's E/P ratio (the inverse of its PIE) and 
the return on its cash. If you earn 5% after taxes on your cash, the buybacks 
are accretive only if your PIE is less than 20 - that is, only if your E/P is above 
5%. There is no information content in the accretion, no value creation; it's 
just simple algebra. And since the S&P 500 has an average PIE of 27, the 
average S&P 500 company would actually suffer dilution from stock 
buybacks in the first year or two. (JACF, 2001, p29) 
Thevenet goes on to note that incomplete analysis tends to miss this point: 
Now, a lot of sellside analysts talk about earnings pick-up. But when they do 
their analysis, they almost always fail to consider that the cash used to 
repurchase stock would otherwise have been used to pay down debt or to 
generate interest income .... So, this great EPS effect is mainly an illusion. If 
you do the math right, it just doesn't exist. (JACF, 2001, p29) 
BNW provide no empirical evidence that share repurchases mcrease short-term 
EPS. Instead, they document a positive contemporaneous relation between share 
repurchases and option exerctses by top-five executives and indirectly infer that 
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managers repurchase shares to increase EPS. However, as noted above, if managers have 
rational expectations about the effect of repurchases on EPS, this inference is extremely 
tenuous. 
An alternative econom1c explanation for a positive relation between repurchases 
and option exercises is that fmns choose to repurchase shares when they face excess cash 
from the proceeds of unexpectedly large stock option exerctses. The magnitude of the 
options-related repurchases documented by BNW appears consistent with this 
interpretation. In Table 3, BNW regress dollar share repurchases on top-five executives' 
option exercises, where exerctses are measured as the market price of the shares at the 
time of exercise less the strike price paid by the employee.4 As noted by BNW, the 
coefficient of 1.19 on ESOEX in Table 3 implies that fmns, on average, repurchase $1.19 
of stock for every $1 that the market price exceeds the strike price. Recall that ESOEX is 
defmed as (P-X) times the number of shares exercised. This coefficient ako implies that 
the cash used for options -related repurchases is less than the exercise proceeds if the 
average price-to-strike ratio of exercised options is less than 1.84: 
1.19(P-X) < X=> PIX < 1.84. 
For the sample of fums used in this study, the median price-to-strike ratio of the options 
exercised by top-five executives is about 2.1. 5 This ratio is likely to be somewhat smaller 
for option exercises by lower-level employees who generally exercise earlier (e.g., 
4 It is useful to note that all of BNW's hypotheses relate to firm-wide stock option plans. BNW use data on 
top-five executives' stock options as a proxy for firm-wide plans. There is evidence that exercise behavior 
of top-five executives differs from that of other employees and that there are industry differences in the 
proportion of firm-wide options granted to top executives (e.g., Huddart and Lang, 1996; Core and Guay, 
200 1) . Thus, BNW's proxy for fmn-wide option exercise activity is likely to measure the desired construct 
with non-random error. 
5 The data to compute this ratio are obtained as described in Footnote 2. To estimate the price-to-strike 
ratios for exercised options, the fiscal year-end stock price is divided by the difference between the fiscal 
year-end stock price and the average in -the-money dollar amount per option exercised. 
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Huddart and Lang, 1996). Further, this analysis ignores the potential compensation-
expense-related tax savings obtained by firms upon option exercise. Taken together, these 
arguments raise questions about whether the cash used to repurchase shares exceeds the 
proceeds from option exercises. If this counter analysis is accurate, it seems difficult to 
argue that the fum must reduce valuable investing expenditures to fund their options-
related repurchase activity, even in the absence of other sources of fmancing. 
4. Are cash constraints and financing costs sufficiently large that share 
repurchases must be funded by diverting cash .from profitable investments? 
As noted by BNW, their hypothesis relies on a critical assumption that their 
sample of S&P 500 fmns face sufficient internal cash constraints and external financing 
constraints such that diverting cash from R&D and capital expenditures is a cost-effective 
means of raising capital for share repurchases. Although BNW say that is it possible that 
their sample fmns experience substantial cash and fmancing constraints, BNW provide 
no empirical support for this claim. Conference participants had difficulty understanding 
when or why these costs are expected to exceed the costs of diverting expenditures from 
valuable investments. BNW leave this question unanswered. 
Analysis of the data do not support the assertion that the sample fmns expenence 
significant cash and fmancing constraints (data obtained as described in Footnote 2). 
Specifically, S&P 500 fnms have sufficient operating cash flow and cash reserves during 
the 1996-1999 period to fund both their repurchasing activity and their investment 
expenditures. The mean (median) dollar repurchases as reported in BNW's Table 1 is 
$270 million ($48 million). By comparison, the mean (median) reserve of cash and 
marketable securities is approximately $700 million ($180 million). Among fnms 
engaged m repurchasing shares, cash and marketable securities 1S 140% of the dollar 
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share repurchases for the median fmn. For the quartile of firms with the greatest option 
exercises (as measured by ESOEX), this percentage exceeds 200%. 
As another comparison, mean (median) free operating cash flow (after R&D and 
capital expenditures) is approximately $620 million ($210 million). Among fnms 
engaged in repurchasing shares, free operating cash flow is 145% of the dollar share 
repurchases for the median fmn (the corresponding figure is 160% for the quartile of 
fmns with the greatest option exercises). 
A casual investigation of the credit ratings and financing xtivities of the S&P 500 
sample reinforces the notion that these fmns are unlikely to perceive reductions in 
investment expenditures as an attractive, cost-effective fmancing alternative. Among the 
sample fmns engaged in repurchasing shares, approximately 70% have commercial paper 
ratings available on Compustat Within this subsample, 95% have ratings of A2 or better, 
which indicates that when needed these fmns can inexpensively raise short-term capital 
by accessing the debt markets (the pre-tax cost of A2 commercial paper is typically about 
30 basis points above the yield on treasury securities of the same maturity). Further, the 
sample fnms tend to be actively involved in debt financing activities. For example, m 
about 78% of the fmn-years, capital is raised through issuance of debt (repayments of 
principal were roughly the same magnitude, resulting in little change in debt for the 
median fmn). 
5. Are managers myopic with respect to short-term EPS? 
Firms in the S&P 500 are among the most successful and well-managed fnms in 
the world. BNW hypothesize that the managers of these fmns systematically squander 
valuable investment opportunities in an obvious way because they are myopically fixated 
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on short-term EPS. However, this assertion seems hard to reconcile with the obsenred 
high petformance and low monitoring costs of the sample flrms. Given that an attempt to 
manage earnings through share repurchases is readily obsenrable by analysts, investors, 
and the board of directors, conference participants found it difficult to construct an 
economic explanation for why managers or shareholders benefit from this behavior. At 
the very least, BNW should provide some careful empirical evidence to support their 
assertion. 
Among the hurdles in constructing such an explanation are the following: 1) 
Repurchasing shares with the proceeds from a reduction in investment expenditures is not 
necessary to manage short-term eammgs upward. Cutting R&D and capital expenditures 
is sufficient to mcrease eammgs in the short-term. As noted in Section 3, repurchasing 
shares with cash diverted from these projects is likely to decrease EPS; 2) Virtually all 
top-executives in this sample enter into multi-year contracting arrangements that tie a 
substantial fraction of their wealth to the stock price (e.g., Hall and Liebman, 1998), and 
earnings-based incentives tend to be small relative to stock-price-based incentives for 
most CEOs (Core, Guay and Verrecchia, 2000). Considerable evidence suggests that 
stock prices are forward-looking and anticipate future earnings (e.g., Kothari and Sloan, 
1992). Therefore, myopic behavior with respect to short-term EPS is costly to managers 
with substantial stock and option portfolios; 3) Because analysts can readily obsenre 
repurchase behavior, any influence of this activity on EPS is expected to be incorporated 
in forecasts, thereby mitigating the likelihood that this behavior will assist managers m 
meeting eammgs forecasts. Also, because the study 1s conducted during a period of 
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substantial eammgs growth among the sample fmns, a story where executives manage 
earnings to beat earnings from prior years seems implausible. 
6. Alternative hypotheses to motivate a relation between repurchases and 
employee stock option plans. 
In addition to BNW's myopic EPS hypothesis, there are alternative economtc 
hypotheses that predict a relation between share repurchases and employee stock option 
plans. One such hypothesis is described in Section 3: ftrms view an unexpected increase 
in stock option exercise proceeds as a nonrecurring cash flow shock to be redistributed to 
stockholders in the form of share repurchases. Another possibility is that fmns favor an 
optimal capital structure. When a ftrm grants options to employees in return for services 
rendered, the value of equity capital increases, and fmancial leverage decreases (on a 
market value basis). As options increase in value over time, fmancial leverage further 
decreases. If employee stock options move the ftrm away from its preferred target capital 
structure, one potential response is share repurchases to reduce leverage. Although this 
argument suggests a relation between share repurchases and employee stock options, it 
does not speak to share repurchases in response to option exercises. Still another 
possibility is that large option grants and exercises have the potential to dilute the voting 
interests of large blockholders. If these shareholders value their fractional ownership 
rights, some ftrms may respond by repurchasing shares to mitigate the ownership dilution 
caused by intensive employee stock option plans. Finally, the value of stock options is 
not dividend protected. That is, because optionholders are not entitled to receive 
dividends, option value is a decreasing function of dividend payments and, other things 
equal, optionholders will prefer to distribute cash through share repurchases rather than 
through dividends (e.g., Bartov, Krinsky and Lee, 1998). 
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7. Empirical issues 
In their concluding statements, BNW point out that their results are potentially not 
intetpretable due to the endogenous determination of share repurchases, option exercises 
and investment expenditures. They argue that a serious attempt to correct these problems 
is beyond the scope of their study. While most empirical researchers can empathize with 
this situation, one cannot ignore potentially serious specification issues. Further, within 
this particular setting, previous research appears to shed insight into at least partial 
remedies for some of the specification problems. 
For example, consider BNW's discussion of the role of share repurchases m 
cotporate payout policy. They argue that, ' 'If share repurchase is the optimal form of 
cotporate payout for fmns with ESOs, then one should see no future decline n delivered 
performance as a result of the cash spent to make these repurchases." This claim is in 
contrast to considerable empirical evidence that share repurchases precede mean 
revers10n m cash flow and return on assets (e.g., Lie and McConnell, 1998; Guay and 
Harford, 2000). BNW attempt to document a decline in ROA following share repurchases 
and intetpret this fmding as evidence that fnms' payout policy is suboptimal. However, 
the payout choice literature suggests an alternative inference; that fmns optimally choose 
to repurchase shares in periods following positive performance but preceding periods of 
mean reversion in performance. This endogeneity problem can potentially be addressed 
by benchmarking the results in BNW against results in studies that examine random 
samples offtrms that repurchase shares. 
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A second endogeneity problem, noted by conference participants and by BNW in 
their concluding remarks, concerns simultaneity issues between option exercises and 
future performance, and between option exercises and option grants. The empirical 
literature on stock options contains several instrumented simultaneous models of exercise 
and grant behavior (e.g., Janakiraman, 1998; Core and Guay, 2001). While BNW claim 
that good instruments are unavailable to address the simultaneity problems in their study, 
this prior research and Heath, Huddart, and Lang [ 1999] suggest several possibilities. 
In a few cases, BNW do attempt to control for certain simultaneity problems. For 
example, BNW predict and document a negative relation between option exercises and 
future investment expenditures and infer that firms reduce investment to fund options-
related share repurchases. However, BNW also note that an alternative hypothesis is that 
executives have private information about future performance and choose to exercise 
options when expected future performance ts poor (part of BNW's "life cycle" affect). 
This potential simultaneity between exerctses and future performance clouds 
interpretation of the results. To control for this problem in their regresstons, BNW 
include measures such as the contemporaneous book-to-market ratio, historical volatility 
of ROA, and historical sales growth. However, if executives' exercise behavior is 
influenced by their p rivate information about future changes in stock price, it is unlikely 
that including publicly available historical variables in the regression will control for this 
effect. 
A separate empirical issue relates to whether the association between option 
exerctses and investment expenditures documented by BNW is economically significant. 
To generate a measure of economtc significance, BNW consider the effect of a one 
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standard deviation change in ESOEX on investment expenditures (standard deviation = 
0.0052). This measure is extremely misleading in that the cross-sectional standard 
deviation of ESOEX appears to be largely influenced by outliers. For example, note that 
the interquartile range of ESOEX is only 0.001, or about one ftfth of the standard 
deviation. It is safe to say that almost none of the sample frrms experienced a change in 
ESOEX equal to 0.0052. Using instead the interquartile range of ESOEX to assess 
economic significance yields an expected decline in R&D of $7 million and a decline in 
capital expenditures of $4 million These numbers are very small compared to mean 
R&D and capital expenditures of $416 million and $764 million, respectively. They are 
also very small when compared to the firms' reserves of cash and marketable securities 
(mean = $700 million) and free operating cash flow ($620 million). 
A related issue is the plausibility of the coefficient magnitudes in BNW's 
regressions of future ROA on ESOEX. BNW report that a one standard deviation change 
in ESOEX results in a $55 million decrease in investment expenditures for the average 
fmn, and a 1.5% reduction in ROA. For the average frrm with assets of $11.8 billion, a 
1.5% reduction in ROA is equivalent to a one-period ahead reduction in earnings of $177 
million; more than 3 times the $55 million reduction in investment expenditures. Thus, if 
BNW's intetpretation of these coefficients is accurate, it raises the question of why the 
sample fmns are diverting funds from among their most profitable investment 
opportunities. 
8. Concluding remarks 
BNW (200 1) investigate the relation between employee stock option plans, 
corporate payout policy and investing decisions. Specifically, BNW hypothesize that 
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fmns divert cash from profitable investment expenditures to fimd share repurchases m an 
attempt to mitigate EPS dilution from stock option exercises. This discussion raises many 
concerns that the assumptions underlying BNW's hypotheses are either tenuous or 
incorrect. In particular, it is not clear that stock option plans dilute EPS or that share 
repurchases effectively increase EPS. Further, even if option plans did dilute EPS and 
repurchases could mitigate this dilution, the sample fnms in this study appear to have 
sufficient internal funds and low cost access to external funds to fmance their repurchase 
activities without diverting funds from investment Finally, BNW provide no explanation 
or empirical support for the incentive structure that supports managers' myopic focus on 
short-term EPS. 
For reasons not yet well understood, firms do appear to care about the fmancial 
accounting implications of employee stock option plans. There are also potential 
economtc hypotheses that support a relation between stock option plans and payout 
choice (e.g., Bartov, Krinsky and Lee, 1998; Grullon and Michaely, 2000). As alluded to 
in BNW, there may also be behavioral aspects of these relations. Research that ties these 
endogenously determined decisions together will provide insight into the role of 
employee stock option plans in the relation between corporate fmance, managerial 
incentives and investing decisions. 
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